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Athletic	Policy,	Passive	Well-Being:	
Defending	Freedom	in	the	Capability	Approach		[Draft.	Final	version	available	in	Economics	and	Philosophy	(2016).]		
1.	Introduction		If	we	accept	that	‘we	are	all	egalitarians	now’,	then	the	central	remaining	question	for	theorists	 of	 distributive	 justice	 is	 –	 in	 what	 sense	 should	 people	 be	 equal?	 Or,	 as	Amartya	 Sen	 famously	put	 it	 in	 his	 1979	Tanner	Lecture,	 if	 our	 aim	 is	 equality,	 then	‘equality	 of	 what’?	 Sen’s	 answer	was	 that	we	 should	 be	 equal	 in	 our	 capabilities,	 or	substantive	 opportunities,	 as	 opposed	 to	 other	 theories	 that	 advocated	 equality	 of	resources	or	welfare.	G.A.	Cohen	has	advanced	an	influential	critique	of	the	answer	that	Sen,	and	other	capability	theorists,	have	provided	to	this	question.	Cohen	(1993;	1994)	suggests	 that	 capability	 theorists	 are	 wrong	 to	 focus	 on	 freedom	 or	 capability	 to	function,	and	ignore	the	value	of	functionings	achieved	without	the	exercise	of	freedom.			The	crux	of	Cohen’s	argument	is,	simply,	that	capability	theorists	take	individuals’	well-being	to	consist	in	the	capabilities	available	to	them.	He	contends	that	by	focussing	on	capabilities	 –	 and	 so	 the	 freedom	 to	 control	 one’s	 life	 –	 capability	 theorists	 ignore	passively-achieved	benefits,	and	provide	an	excessively	‘athletic’	account	of	well-being.	He	 maintains	 that,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 our	 well-being	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 world	conforming	 to	 our	 will	 because	 it	 is	 our	 will,	 or	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 our	 choices	 or	actions:	 “[t]here	 are	many	 benefits	 I	 get	 which	 I	 do	 not	 literally	 succeed	 in	 getting”	(Cohen	1994:	23).	Given	this,	Cohen	insists	that	theorists	of	distributive	justice	should	be	 concerned	with	 how	 good	 individuals’	 lives	 actually	 are,	 as	well	 as	whether	 they	have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 lead	 a	 good	 life:	 “[s]urely	 what	 matters,	 normatively,	 is	whether	individuals	are	 living	well”	not	just	whether	they	can	(Richardson	2000:	318	(my	 emphasis)).1	 Cohen	 suggests	 that	 capability	 theorists	 can	 only	 incorporate	 a	concern	 for	 these	 passively-achieved	 benefits	 if	 possessing	 a	 capability	 is	 no	 longer	taken	to	entail	that	we	are	free	to	achieve	a	benefit	for	ourselves.			Cohen,	 therefore,	 contends	 that	 capability	 theorists	 must	 choose	 between	 an	implausibly	 athletic	 definition	 of	 well-being	 (wherein	 we	 are	 only	 benefitted	 by	outcomes	 we	 achieve	 ourselves),	 and	 an	 implausibly	 weak	 or	 expansive	 reading	 of																																																									1	Whilst	some	authors	(for	example,	Richardson	(2000),	Arneson	(2000),	Fleurbaey	(2006))	argue	that	our	focus	should	be	functionings	rather	than	capabilities,	Cohen	suggests	that	that	our	focus	should	be	functionings	as	well	as	capabilities.	It	is	important	both	that	individuals	can	live	well,	and	that	they	do.		
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freedom	 (wherein	 freedom	 does	 not	 require	 that	 we	 control	 outcomes).	 Previous	responses	to	Cohen	have	defended	the	capability	approach	by	grasping	the	latter	horn,	and	insisting	that	an	unathletic	interpretation	of	freedom	in	the	capability	approach	is	not	 implausible.2	 Yet,	 I	 argue,	 capability	 theorists	 need	not	 face	 this	 dichotomy:	 they	can	maintain	both	that	freedom	requires	control,	and	that	passively-achieved	benefits	may	improve	an	individual’s	well-being.	This	is	because	capabilities	are	not	presented	simply	 as	 components	 of	 individual	 well-being,	 but	 as	 the	 appropriate	 goal	 of	 just	distributive	policies.	 Freedom	as	 control	 can,	 therefore,	be	defended	as	a	policy	goal,	without	implying	that	such	freedom	is	constitutive	of	well-being.			Thus,	 Cohen’s	 critique	 is	 not,	 as	 he	 implies,	 an	 internal	 one,	 arguing	 that	 capability	theorists	have	failed	to	meet	their	own	goal	of	properly	characterising	individual	well-being.	 Rather,	 it	 amounts	 to	 the	 suggestion	 that	 capability	 theorists	 have	 erred	 in	providing	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 ‘equality	 of	 what?’	 question	 that	 does	 not	 incorporate	 a	comprehensive	 and	 accurate	 account	 of	 well-being,	 and	 is,	 instead,	 concerned	 to	protect	and	promote	individual	autonomy	and	agency.	I	will	not	take	a	view	on	whether	capability	theorists	should	become	(completely	or	partially)	welfarists.	I	will,	however,	defend	 capabilities	 as	 a	 coherent	 metric	 of	 distributive	 justice,	 and	 one	 likely	 to	 be	appealing	to	those	concerned	to	devise	policy	that	prioritises	individual	autonomy	and	avoids	 paternalism,	 rather	 than	 maximising	 well-being	 by	 any	 means.	 We	 may,	 as	Cohen	 (1994:	 124)	 claims,	 “unambivalently	 welcome”	 the	 world	 coincidentally	conforming	 with	 our	 will,	 without	 similarly	 welcoming	 government	 action	coincidentally	ensuring	such	conformity,	without	reference	to	our	will.			I	 will,	 therefore,	 suggest	 that	 capability	 theorists	 should	 not	 respond	 to	 Cohen	 by	abandoning	an	athletic	understanding	of	freedom	(as	requiring	control)	(§2),	and	will	defend	 prioritising	 such	 freedom	 in	 public	 policy	 (§3).	 Thus,	 I	 will	 argue	 that,	understood	 as	 a	 guide	 to	 distributive	 policy,	 the	 capability	 approach’s	 focus	 on	individual	freedom	and	control	is	justified:	in	the	public	domain	it	is	important	not	just	that	 individuals	 receive	 ‘benefits’	 but	 that	 they	 participate	 in	 their	 achievement.	 The	‘athleticism’	 of	 which	 Cohen	 accuses	 the	 capability	 approach	 is	 not	 an	 element	capability	theorists	should	aim	to	eliminate,	but	one	they	should	celebrate.		
	
2.	Goals	of	the	Capability	Approach:	Public	Policy	and	Non-Instrumental	Freedom	
	
																																																								2	For	example,	Sen	(1993)	and	Olsaretti	(2005).	See	§2.2	for	further	discussion.		
3	
	
Sen	 developed	 the	 capability	 approach	 in	 response	 to	 perceived	 problems	 in	development	 policy	 and	 so,	 in	 part,	 to	 problems	 in	measurements	 of	well-being	 and	quality	of	 life	on	which	these	policies	were	based.	The	capability	approach,	therefore,	has	 been,	 and	 continues	 to	 be,	 used	 as	 a	 “standard	 of	 individual	 advantage”	 or	well-being	(Olsaretti	2005:	90).	However,	my	focus	here	is	on	the	capability	approach	as	a	response	to	the	‘equality	of	what?’	or,	as	Olsaretti	(2005:	89)	more	accurately	terms	it,	the	“distribution	of	what?”	question.	In	this	role,	the	capability	approach	functions	as	a	guide	to	policy:	to	the	distributive	outcome	that	governments	should	promote.3			Understood	 as	 a	 theory	 of	 distributive	 justice,	 concerned	 with	 guiding	 policy,	 and	delineating	the	legitimate	basis	of	government	action,	the	approach	will	not	provide	a	comprehensive	account	of	 all	 factors	 that	 contribute	 to	our	well-being.	As	Nussbaum	(2011:	 32-33)	 puts	 it,	 its	 purpose	 is	 to	 establish	 the	 “task	 of	 government…[under]	 a	decent	 political	 order”,	 and,	 if	 we	 reject	 welfarism,	 the	 ‘task	 of	 government’	 is	 not	merely	 the	 promotion	 of	well-being.	 Thus,	 like	 Carter	 (2014,	 76)	 “[t]he	 object	 of	my	investigation	is	the	capability	approach	understood	as	a	normative	political	theory…not	merely	 as	 a	 non-political	 (or	 not-necessarily-political)	 theory	 of	 the	 quality	 of	life…[but]	 as	 a	 theory	 that	 contains	 or	 entails	 certain	 political	 prescriptions”.	 It	 is	 as	
political	prescriptions	that	capabilities,	requiring	freedom	as	control,	are	promoted,	and	in	the	political	context	that	the	focus	on	control	is	justified.			
2.1	Cohen’s	Critique		Cohen	 approves	 of	 much	 of	 what	 the	 capability	 approach	 sets	 out	 to	 achieve,	 and	commends	Sen	for	his	identification	of	a	space	between	resources	and	utility	in	answer	to	the	 ‘equality	of	what?’	question.	Cohen	accepts	capability	theorists’	contention	that	resourcist	approaches	fail	to	take	account	of	individuals’	different	resource	needs	and	conversion	 capacities	 (ability	 to	 ‘convert’	 resources	 into	 achieved	 functionings).	Consequently,	 he	 agrees	 that	 we	 should	 not	 consider	 what	 goods	 or	 resources	individuals	 possess,	 but	 what	 goods	 do	 for	 people.	 He	 also	 agrees	 with	 capability	theorists	 that	 the	welfarist	assessment	of	goods,	 in	 terms	of	 the	utility	 they	generate,	takes	too	narrow	a	view	of	what	goods	do	for	people.	Given	this,	Cohen	agrees	that	we	should	 not	 adopt	 either	 of	 these	 standard	 approaches	 wholesale,	 and	 should	 focus	
																																																								3	 Sen	 (2009;	 2010)	 has	 noted	 the	 political	 role	 of	 the	 capability	 approach	 in	 recent	work,	 and	Nelson	(2008:	118,	fn.42),	for	example,	suggests	that	though	“the	capability	approach	emerged	out	of	an	attempt	to	redefine	‘development’…Sen	converted	it	into	a	claim	about	moral	philosophy	and	distributive	justice	quite	 early	 on”.	 Sen	 continues	 to	 emphasise	 its	 diverse	 applications,	 however,	 so	 in	 considering	 the	approach	solely	as	a	theory	of	distributive	justice	I	am	more	in	line	with	Nussbaum’s	work.	
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instead	on	the	(valuable)	activities	or	states	of	being	that	goods	enable	us	to	achieve:	the	functionings	they	give	us	the	capability	to	perform.			Cohen	 disagrees,	 however,	when	 Sen	 calls	 this	 space,	 between	 resources	 and	 utility,	‘capabilities’,	 since	 this	 implies	 that	what	matters	 is	what	 goods	 enable	 us	 to	 do	 for	
ourselves.	Cohen	(1993:	19)	contends	that	the	space	Sen	has	identified	is	broader	than	the	categories	of	either	capabilities	or	functionings	imply:	“[w]hat	goods	do	to	people	is	identical	neither	with	what	people	are	able	to	do	with	them	[their	capabilities]	nor	with	what	 they	 actually	 do	 with	 them	 [their	 achieved	 functionings]”.	 Thus,	 Cohen	 argues	that	we	should	not	be	concerned	only	with	individuals’	capabilities.			Cohen	points	out	that	goods	may	also	provide	us	with	passively-achieved	benefits.	For	example,	 babies	 do	not	maintain	 themselves	 through	 the	 exercise	 of	 capabilities,	 but	nonetheless	 get	 more	 from	 goods	 than	 just	 utility:	 they	 also	 experience	 (without	participating	 in	 the	 achievement	 of)	 valuable	 functionings,	 such	 as	 nourishment	 or	health.	Moreover,	it	is	not	for	the	sake	of	their	utility	alone	that	we	think	we	ought	to	provide	 them	with	 these	 goods.	 Adults,	 too,	 can	 get	 benefits	 from	goods	without	 the	exercise	of	 capabilities:	 health	 from	being	 in	 a	malaria-free	 environment	or	 from	 the	rays	of	the	sun,	for	example,	or	nourishment	from	a	nutrient	drip.			Cohen	 (1993:	 18)	 calls	 the	 broader	 category	 of	 “what	 goods	 do	 to	 (or	 for)	 human	beings”,	with	or	without	their	participation,	‘midfare’.	On	this	view,	it	is	not	always	our	capability	 to	 achieve	 functionings	 that	 matters,	 but	 sometimes	 merely	 their	achievement.	Midfare,	then,	incorporates	three	valuable	categories:		(a) the	substantive	opportunity	to	perform	a	valuable	functioning	(capabilities);		(b) a	(valuable)	activity	or	state	of	being	(functioning),	achieved:		(i) through	an	individual’s	activity	(exercised	freedom	to	function);	or	(ii) without	their	participation	(passively-achieved).		Cohen	 argues	 that	 this	 final	 category	 –	 passively-achieved	 benefits	 –	 contributes	 to	individual	well-being,	but	 that	Sen	 ignores	 it,	being	concerned	only	with	our	 freedom	and	 its	 exercise,	 and	 that,	 as	 such,	 his	 account	 of	well-being	 is	 excessively	 ‘athletic’.4	Cohen	does	not	dispute	the	value	of	 freedom	and,	 indeed,	 includes	 it	as	an	 important	element	 of	midfare.5	His	 concern	 is	 that	 capability	 theorists	wrongly	 insist	 that	 for	 a	
																																																								4	Under	Cohen’s	(1993:	28)	own	preferred	approach	–	equal	access	to	advantage	–	“the	normative	accent	is	not	on	capability	as	such,	but	on	an	agent	not	 lacking	an	urgent	desideratum	through	no	 fault	of	his	own”,	even	if	this	achieved	without	the	participation	of	the	benefitted	individual.		5	Sen’s	(1993:	45)	criticism	of	midfare	for	failing	to	distinguish	the	fasting	rich	person,	and	the	starving	poor,	therefore,	seems	uncharitable.		
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functioning	to	contribute	to	our	well-being	it	is	necessary	that	we	are	free	to	perform	it,	and	that	we	achieve	this	functioning	through	an	exercise	of	our	freedom.		Cohen	 focuses	 his	 critique	 on	 Sen’s	 elaboration	 of	 the	 capability	 approach,	 and	 in	presenting	his	account	I	have	maintained	this	focus.	However,	the	same	points	could	be	raised	 against	 any	 approach	 that	 considers	 individuals	 entitled	 to	 capabilities,	 as	substantive	 opportunities	 to	 perform	 functionings.	 I	 will	 not,	 therefore,	 defend	 a	particular	 version	 of	 the	 capability	 approach	 –	 such	 as	 Sen’s	 or	 Nussbaum’s	 –	 nor	discuss	the	nuances	of	these	approaches.	I	will	understand	the	capability	approach,	in	broad	 terms,	 to	 propose	 that	 the	 justice	 of	 a	 distribution	 is	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	individuals’	 access	 to	 capabilities,	 and	 that	 redistribution	 should	 aim	 to	 ensure	 such	access.6	 I	 aim	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 protecting	 and	 promoting	 the	 athletic	 freedom	entailed	by	capabilities	may	be	a	plausible	guide	to	distributive	policy,	and	that	Cohen’s	critique	 should	 not	 lead	 us	 to	 rule	 out	 capabilities	 as	 a	metric	 of	 distributive	 justice	(distinct	from	midfare).			
2.2	Freedom	and	Choice	in	the	Capability	Approach		I	follow	Cohen	(1995:	102)	in	accepting	that	“real	freedom”,	or	freedom	“worthy	of	the	name”,	 is	 “the	 circumstance	 of	 genuine	 control	 over	 one’s	 life”	 (my	 emphasis).	 I	therefore	agree	that	cases	where	the	world	coincidentally	conforms	to	one’s	will	–	Sen’s	(1992:	64-5)	notion	of	 ‘effective	freedom’,	or	what	Cohen	(1994:	120-5)	calls	a	‘weak’	reading	of	 freedom	–	are	not	 instances	of	 freedom.	 I	will	 take	 ‘freedom’	 to	mean	that	our	choices	(or	preferences)	must	exert	control	in	the	world	or	determine	an	outcome:	my	 choice	 will	 be	 satisfied	 because	 it	 was	 my	 choice.7	 Thus,	 in	 contrast	 to	 other	responses	–	such	as	Sen’s	and	Olsaretti’s,	discussed	below	–	my	response	to	Cohen	does	not	 depend	on	 insisting	 that	he	 overemphasises	 the	 ‘athleticism’	 of	 the	 freedom	 that	capability	 theorists	 promote.	 I	 agree,	 then,	 that	 freedom	 in	 the	 capability	 approach																																																									6	 I	 take	 no	 view	 on	 the	 appropriate	 distributive	 principle	 –	 egalitarian,	 sufficientarian,	 prioritarian	 or	other.	 I	 will	 primarily	 consider	 views	 that	 suggest	 we	 should	 have	 capabilities	 to	 perform	 specific	
valuable	functionings	(however	identified).	Such	views	are	widely-held	(by	both	Nussbaum	and	Sen,	for	example),	 and	 it	 is	 often	 assumed	 that	 any	 version	 of	 the	 capability	 approach	must	 be	 so	 committed	(Carter	2014;	Olsaretti	2005:	94).	However,	I	also	discuss	approaches	that	do	not	specify	what	we	should	have	 the	 capability	 for,	 since	 these	 are	 especially	 vulnerable	 to	 Cohen’s	 critique,	 given	 that	 they	 are	particularly	concerned	with	individuals’	freedom	rather	than	the	‘benefits’	they	actually	achieve.	7	 I	 follow	Philip	Pettit	here	 in	arguing	that	 it	 is	sufficient	 for	 freedom	that	our	preferences,	not	 just	our	choices,	 be	 decisive.	 Roughly,	 a	 choice	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 our	 explicit	 selection	 of	 an	 option,	 and	 a	preference	 as	 what	 we	 “counterfactually	 would	 have	 chosen”	 (Pettit	 2010:	 92).	 I	 freely	 achieve	 an	outcome	if	my	preference	is	satisfied	because	it	is	my	preference,	since	“[my]	preference	is	at	the	origin	of	a	causal	sequence	that	 fixes	the	alternative	to	be	realised”	(Pettit	2010:	100).	For	example,	 this	 is	so	 if	someone	 acts	 to	 ensure	 I	 receive	 the	 medical	 treatment	 I	 prefer	 (because	 I	 prefer	 it)	 even	 if	 I	 am	unconscious,	and	so	incapable	of	choosing.		
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requires	 control.	 I	 disagree	 that	 this	 gives	 us	 reason	 to	 reject	 this	 approach	 to	distributive	justice.			It	 is	worth	emphasising	that	given	that	my	concern	is	with	the	capability	approach	to	
distributive	justice,	I	need	not	make	the	strong	claim	that	freedom	per	se	must	involve	control.	Rather,	I	suggest	that	freedom	as	it	is	understood	and	promoted	(by	capability	theorists)	 as	 a	 political	 value,	 should	 involve	 control.	 Thus,	 in	 response	 to	 Cohen’s	(1994:	124)	contention	that:		[t]here	 are	 two	 values	 associated	 with	 the	 successful	 exercise	 of	 freedom.	One	 is	 that	 the	world	 conforms	 to	my	will	 and	 the	 other	 is	 that	 it	 is	 I	who	achieve	that	result.	Sometimes	the	second	value	does	not	matter	much…	I	would	suggest	that	the	second	value	matters	a	great	deal	in	the	political	domain.	Most	liberal	 approaches	 aim	 to	 avoid	 the	 imposition	 of	 paternalist	 policies,	 where	paternalism	constitutes	interference	with	an	agent’s	autonomous	choices,	motivated	by	a	distrust	of	 their	ability	 to	make	decisions	 in	 their	best	 interests	and	an	assumption	that	 the	 intervening	 agent’s	 judgement	 is	 superior.8	 Rather,	 liberals	 aim	 to	 respect	individuals	 as	 agents	 capable	 of	 formulating	 goals	 (“originators	 of	 ends”	 (Taylor	 in	Carter	 2014:	 82)),	 and	 to	 allow	 them	 the	 freedom	 to	pursue	 these	 ends,	without	 the	imposition	 of	 a	 perfectionist	 conception	 of	 the	 good.	 The	 capability	 approach	 is	 one	such	liberal	theory,	and	though	promoting	capabilities	may	increase	well-being,	its	goal	is	not	to	maximise	well-being	but	to	respect	individuals	as	autonomous	agents.9			I	 will	 not	 provide	 an	 independent	 argument	 for	 promoting	 anti-paternalist	 public	policy,	or	try	to	convince	those	unmoved	by	the	value	of	individual	autonomy,	and	the	importance	of	 a	 state	 allowing	 its	 free	 exercise.10	Rather,	 I	will	 show	how	 the	 liberal	values	 and	 anti-paternalist	 commitments	 in	 the	 capability	 approach	 can	 be	 plausibly	realised.	I	believe	that	this	requires	that	individuals	have	freedom	as	control	over	their	lives	(Cohen’s	‘second	value’,	above).	As	Sen	(1992:	65)	notes,	“it	is	often	very	hard,	if	not	 impossible,	 to	have	a	system	that	gives	each	person	all	 the	 levers	of	control	over	her	own	life”,	however	it	is	access	to	these	‘levers’	we	should	promote.	I	will	expand	on																																																									8	Defining	paternalism	 is	 a	 complex	matter,	but	 this	broad	definition	 is	 relatively	uncontroversial,	 and	consistent	with	many	influential	accounts	(e.g.	Shiffrin	2000;	Quong	2011).	9	 Sen	 may	 be	 interpreted	 as	 understanding	 well-being	 in	 terms	 of	 functionings	 and	 capabilities	 to	function:	 promoting	 capabilities,	 then,	 may	 amount	 to	 promoting	 well-being.	 However,	 Sen	 also	discusses	 the	 significance	 of	 agency	 as	 distinct	 from	well-being:	 “the	 goals	 and	 values…[an	 agent]	 has	reason	to	pursue,	whether	or	not	they	are	connected	with	her	own	well-being”	(Sen	1992:	56).	(See	also	Cudd	2014;	Crocker	and	Robeyns	2010.)	Thus,	 though	 ‘agency-freedoms’	are	distinct	 from	capabilities	(‘well-being	freedoms’),	Sen	would	advocate	policies	that	promoted	both	agency	and	well-being.	(I	will	consider	the	problems	with	Sen’s	unathletic	interpretation	of	these	freedoms	below.)			10	 For	 arguments	 for	 the	 benefits	 of	 liberal,	 anti-paternalist	 public	 policy,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Feinberg	(1986),	Mill	(1974),	Quong	(2011),	Nussbaum	(2000:	51-59).			
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my	understanding	 of	 freedom	as	 control	 below	 (§2.3),	 before	 arguing	 that	 capability	theorists’	focus	on	such	‘athletic’	freedom	is	justified,	when	devising	distributive	policy	(§3).	First,	though,	I	will	consider	the	problems	with	responding	to	Cohen	by	claiming	that	 capability	 theorists’	 focus	 on	 freedom	 is	 justified	 because	 freedom	 need	 not	 be	understood	athletically.			In	his	response	to	Cohen,	Sen	(1993:	43)	insists	that	“athleticism	was	never	intended”,	and	Cohen	was	 simply	 “misled”	by	words	 such	as	 ‘capability’	 and	 ‘achieving’.	 Indeed,	Sen’s	(1993:44)	position	as	he	presents	it	here	seems	very	close	to	Cohen’s:		an	active	exercise	of	freedom	might	well	be	valuable	for	a	person’s	quality	of	life	and	achieved	well-being…[but]	freedom	has	many	aspects…and	it	would	be	 a	 mistake	 to	 think	 of	 achievements	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 active	 choice	 by	
oneself.		Active	choice	is	“an	important	component	of	living	freely”	(Sen	1993:	44),	then,	but	it	is	only	one	component,	and	freedom	does	not	always	need	to	involve	such	activity.	In	this	way,	Sen	may	avoid	Cohen’s	charges	of	athleticism,	but	Cohen	seems	right	to	point	out	that	 it	 is	 rather	 counterintuitive	 to	 say	 that	 someone’s	 freedom	 “is	 enhanced…when	something	he	or	she	values	occurs….even	when	the	person	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	occurrence”	(Sen	in	Crocker	and	Robeyns	2010:	77).		Rejecting	 Sen’s	 interpretation	 in	 favour	 of	 freedom	 as	 control	will	 require	 biting	 the	bullet	on	a	point	that	is	considered	a	reductio	ad	absurdum	of	using	athletic	freedom	in	the	capability	approach:	that	we	should	have	control	both	over	which	functionings	we	exercise,	 and	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 we	 choose.11	 Capabilities	 are,	 essentially,	substantive	 opportunities,	 “created	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 personal	 abilities,	 and	 the	
political,	 social,	and	economic	environment”	(Nussbaum	2011:	20	(my	emphasis)).	Sen	(2001:	54-56;	1999:	xi-xii),	too,	emphasises	the	contribution	of	external	circumstances,	policies,	 and	 decisions	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 these	 opportunities.	 However,	 though	 Sen	acknowledges	the	instrumental	value	of	background	conditions,	he	insists	that	having	a	capability	does	not	depend	on	our	ability	to	control	these	conditions	(and	so	determine	whether	 an	 opportunity	 is	 available	 to	 us).	 For	 example,	 Sen	 (2001:	 54)	 does	 not	distinguish	 between	 a	 disabled	 individual	 who	 has	 the	 capability	 “to	 go	 out	 of	 her	house	whenever	she	wants	and	to	move	around	freely”	because	she	“is	always	helped	
																																																								11	 “It	 would	 be	 implausible	 to	 insist,	 for	 example,	 that	 what	 we	 should	 ensure	 is	 not	 that	 malaria	 is	eradicated,	 but	 that	 people	 enjoy	 control	 over	whether	 or	 not	 there	 is	malaria	 in	 their	 environment”	(Olsaretti	2005:	93).	(See	also:	Sen	2001:	55-56;	Cohen	1994:	121.)		
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by	 volunteers	with	 goodwill”,	 and	 one	 is	 enabled	 to	 do	 so	 by	 servants	who	 “have	 to	obey…her	command”.12			The	 freedom	 (and	 well-being)	 of	 the	 individual	 dependent	 on	 the	 goodwill	 of	volunteers	may	indeed	be	increased,	but	this	is	not	the	freedom	that	a	liberal,	respect-based,	 anti-paternalist	 capability	 approach	 should	promote.	 Individuals	 cannot	 freely	form	 and	 pursue	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 good	 if	 they	 cannot	 be	 certain	 that	 they	 will	continue	 to	 have	 access	 to	 central	 capabilities	 (the	 volunteers’	 goodwill	may	 cease),	and	 are	 not	 respected	 as	 agents	 if	 they	 must	 court	 this	 goodwill	 to	 maintain	 such	access.	Thus,	non-contingent,	secure	freedom	should	be	the	goal	of	liberal	public	policy.	I	believe	that	this	requires	both	the	first-order	freedom	to	control	whether	we	function,	and	the	second-order	freedom	to	control	which	functionings	are	available	to	us	(§2.3).	Opportunities	alone	do	contribute	to	 individual	 freedom,	then,	but	the	opportunity	to	determine	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 opportunities	also	 contributes,	 and	 governments	 have	reason	to	promote	both	(as	§3.2	will	argue).			Serena	 Olsaretti	 also	 responds	 to	 Cohen	 by	 insisting	 that	 freedom	 in	 the	 capability	approach	 is	 not	 athletic.	 Her	 argument	 runs,	 briefly,	 as	 follows:	 the	 endorsement	 of	valuable	 functionings	 is	 necessary	 for	well-being;	 endorsement	 is	 best	 secured	when	people	 choose	 freely	which	 functionings	 to	 achieve;	 and	 people	 are	 better	 placed	 to	choose	 freely	when	they	also	have	the	 freedom	to	 forgo	 functionings	(Olsaretti	2005:	98-100).	I	believe	Olsaretti’s	response	moves	in	the	wrong	direction	in	two	ways.	First,	capabilities,	 on	 her	 view,	 have	 merely	 instrumental	 (and	 so	 contingent)	 value	 as	 a	means	to	ensuring	 individuals	endorse	valuable	 functionings.	Second,	Olsaretti	 insists	that	providing	 these	capabilities	does	not	 involve	an	athletic	 (or,	 in	Olsaretti’s	 (2005:	100)	 words,	 “hyperactive”)	 notion	 of	 freedom.	 Endorsement	 is	 not	 understood	 in	 a	strong	sense,	involving	active	choice	or	control,	but	is	merely	taken	to	mean	that	“the	functioning	 is	 not	 forced	 on	 me”	 (Olsaretti	 2005:	 100).	 This	 thin	 definition	 of	endorsement	may	include	instances	when	a	person’s	will	is	bypassed,	such	as	cases	of	brainwashing,	indoctrination,	or	hypnosis	(Olsaretti	2005:	103-104).		Both	 these	 elements	 are	 incompatible	 with	 the	 central	 concerns	 of	 the	 capability	approach	 to	 protect	 individual	 freedom,	 and	 avoid	 paternalism.	 For	many	 capability	theorists,	 including	 both	 Sen	 and	 Nussbaum,	 freedom	 has	 intrinsic,	 not	 merely	instrumental,	 value.13	 Capabilities	 are	 not	 promoted	 as	 the	 best	means	 to	 ensure	 all																																																									12	 To	 avoid	 any	 ethical	 concerns	 about	 employing	 servants,	we	 could	 substitute	machines	 that	 fulfil	 a	similar	role.		13	For	example,	Nussbaum	2011:	198;	Sen	1993:	39.		
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individuals	perform	valuable	functionings,	but	because	“a	focus	on	dignity	will	dictate	policy	 choices	 that	 protect	 and	 support	 agency”	 (Nussbaum	 2011:	 30).	 Olsaretti’s	instrumental	approach	also	means	the	justification	for	promoting	capabilities	depends	on	 there	 being	 a	 stable	 causal	 connection	 between	 providing	 individuals	 with	capabilities,	 and	 their	 endorsing	 valuable	 functionings.	 Given	 Olsaretti’s	 weak	definition	 of	 endorsement,	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 this	 causal	 connection	 often	 will	 not	hold.	This	makes	the	toleration	of	individuals	pursuing	various	conceptions	of	the	good,	and	a	variety	of	functionings,	rather	tenuous.	If	a	superior	means	were	found	to	make	people	endorse	 the	 ‘right’	 choice,	 and	perform	 ‘valuable’	 functionings	 (more	effective	brainwashing	techniques?),	such	toleration	would	no	longer	be	necessary.14		Thus,	Olsaretti’s	abandonment	of	an	athletic	understanding	of	 freedom,	 in	favour	of	a	more	minimal	interpretation	(as	‘not	being	forced’),	and	instrumental	construal	of	the	value	of	freedom,	means	individuals’	autonomous	choices	are	only	contingently,	and	so	not	 securely,	 protected.	 Similarly,	 Sen’s	 lack	 of	 concern	 with	 how	 opportunities	 are	established	 does	 not	 securely	 protect	 capabilities,	 or	 individuals’	 ability	 to	 form	 and	pursue	a	 conception	of	 the	good,	 free	 from	dependency	on	 the	goodwill	 of	others.	 In	defending	an	approach,	it	is	preferable	to	uphold	its	central	motivating	concerns,	rather	than	 abandoning	 them,	 and	 an	unathletic	 conception	of	 freedom	 is	 a	poor	base	 from	which	 to	 pursue	 the	 liberal	 and	 anti-paternalist	 goals	 endorsed	 by	 many	 capability	theorists.	I	will	argue	that	it	is	possible	to	defend	a	version	of	the	capability	approach	that	considers	athletic	freedom	(as	control)	as	of	intrinsic	importance,	and	which	can,	therefore,	avoid	paternalism,	and	respect	individuals’	autonomy	and	agency.			
2.3	(Political)	Freedom	as	Control		Yet	 two	challenges	remain.	First,	more	needs	 to	be	said	about	what	 it	means	 to	have	freedom	 as	 control.	 Second,	 it	 should	 be	 explained	 why	 what	 seems	 attractive	 in	Cohen’s	 criticism	 –	 that	 sometimes	 passively-achieved	 benefits	 are	 worth	 pursuing,	regardless	 of	 the	 affected	 individuals’	 preferences	 –	 is	 not,	 in	 fact,	 compelling.	 I	 will	begin	my	response	to	the	first	challenge	here,	outlining	what	it	means	for	individuals	to	have	control.	The	following	section	will	continue	this	response,	considering	the	sense	in	which	individuals	can	be	said	to	have	control	in	‘group’	cases	(§3.2),	as	well	as	taking																																																									14	 Olsaretti	 (2005:	 104-106)	 considers	 the	 objection	 that	 the	 connection	 between	 endorsement	 and	freedom	may	merely	 be	 contingent,	 especially	 since	 endorsement	 as	 she	 defines	 it	 is	 sometimes	 best	achieved	using	force.	Yet	her	response	–	that	“we	lack	the	information	necessary	for	identifying	the	cases	in	which	endorsement	could,	in	the	long	term,	be	obtained	through	force”	(Olsaretti	2005:	106)	–	will	be	unsatisfactory	to	an	anti-paternalist,	who	want	policies	that	 in	principle	rule	out	such	interference.	It	 is	scant	 protection	 against	 paternalism	 that	 we	 do	 not	 currently	 have	 the	 information	 necessary	 to	 be	effective	paternalists	(as	Carter	(2014:	87)	also	notes).		
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up	 the	 second	 challenge,	 arguing	 for	 the	 plausibility	 of	 the	 focus	 on	 such	 athletic	freedom	in	the	political	domain	(§3.1;	§3.3).			Simply	put,	I	understand	freedom	as	control	to	require	that	our	preferences	or	choices,	made	in	a	procedurally	appropriate	way,	should	determine	outcomes	independently	of	their	 content	 and	 context.	 Each	 of	 these	 three	 elements	 –	 appropriate	 procedure,	content,	and	context	–	require	some	elucidation.	First,	then,	I	suggest	that	our	choices	should	 be	 made	 under	 procedural	 conditions,	 such	 that	 ‘endorsement’	 means	something	 more	 substantive	 than	 Olsaretti’s	 use	 of	 the	 term,	 according	 to	 which	endorsement	 is	mere	assent	 in	 the	absence	of	 force.	 Instead,	 I	mean	something	more	akin	to	Nussbaum’s	practical	reason,	with	its	emphasis	on	being	able	to	plan	one’s	life,	and	 “engage	 in	 critical	 reflection”	 about	 that	 plan	 (Nussbaum	 2000:	 79).	 Thus,	 we	should	 require	 that	 our	 choices	 meet	 something	 like	 Feinberg’s	 (1986:	 104-106)	conditions	 of	 voluntary	 choice:	 they	 should	 be	 formed	 without	 coercion,	 with	knowledge	 of	 the	 relevant	 empirical	 facts,	 in	 a	 clear	 emotional	 state,	 not	 based	 on	mistaken	reasoning,	and	be	carefully	considered.		Requiring	procedural	prerequisites	 for	 free	choice	fits	with	Pettit’s	(2007)	suggestion	that	 freedom	 requires	 that	 individuals’	 choices	 are	 decisive	 independently	 of	 their	content	 and	 context.	 Content-independence	means	 that	 an	 individual’s	 choice	 should	be	decisive	regardless	of	what	they	choose:	for	example,	whether	or	not	an	individual	chooses	 to	 perform	 a	 valuable	 functioning.	 This	 fits	 with	 my	 suggestion	 that	 choice	should	not	 (and	 in	many	 iterations	does	not)	have	 a	merely	 instrumental	 role	 in	 the	capability	approach:	capabilities	are	not	merely	a	means	to	ensuring	individuals	make	the	‘right’	choices.	For	an	individual	to	have	the	capability	for	nourishment,	then,	they	must	 be	 able	 to	 choose	 both	 to	 be	 nourished	 and	 to	 fast;	 to	 have	 the	 capability	 for	health	they	must	be	able	to	choose	to	be	healthy	or	unhealthy.			Context,	 favour,	 or	 permit-independence	 requires	 that	 the	 decisiveness	 of	 our	preferences,	or	our	ability	to	control	an	outcome,	should	not	depend	on	the	‘gratuitous	favour’	 of	 a	 third	 party.15	 Thus,	we	 are	 not	 free	 if	 our	 preferences	 are	 decisive	 only	insofar	as	we	 retain	 the	 favour	of	 some	other(s).	This	would	 rule	out	our	possessing	capabilities	 under	 a	 dictatorship,	 however	 benevolent.	 Pettit	 (2007:	 13-15)	 gives	 an	example	of	a	benevolent	potentate	who	uses	his	wealth	to	improve	the	healthcare	and	education	systems	of	his	country.	As	long	as	our	access	to	these	benefits	depends	on	his	favour,	we	do	not	possess	the	capability	for	health	or	education.	Even	if,	for	as	long	as																																																									15	Pettit	(2010:	98-99)	now	refers	to	permit,	rather	than	context,	independence,	as	will	I,	since	this	better	captures	the	significant	feature	of	our	context	(the	permission	of	a	third-party).		
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his	favour	lasts,	we	can	achieve	these	functionings,	we	lack	these	capabilities	since	we	lack	 effective	 control	 over	 whether	 we	 are	 able	 to	 function.16	 The	 significance	 of	permit-independence	is	particularly	clear	in	collective	action	cases,	as	§3.2	will	discuss.				I	suggest	that	possessing	a	capability	requires	that	these	three	conditions	be	met.	This	is	 certainly	 an	 athletic	 form	 of	 freedom,	 in	 Cohen’s	 sense,	 but	 not,	 I	 will	 argue,	implausibly	so.	It	is	worth	reiterating	that	I	am	not	claiming	that	this	interpretation	is	true	 of	 every	 version	 of	 the	 capability	 approach	 (to	 distributive	 justice),	 though	 I	 do	believe	that	it	captures	the	motivating	concerns	of	many	prominent	versions.	Instead,	I	propose	that	for	those	concerned	to	avoid	paternalism	in	the	implementation	of	public	policy,	 rather	 than	 the	 achievement	of	 individual	well-being	by	 any	means,	 this	 view	will	 have	 some	 appeal.17	 Promoting	 athletic	 capabilities	 is	 a	 coherent	 goal,	 and	 a	defensible	 response	 to	 the	 ‘equality	of	what?’	 question,	 and	does	not	merely	 signal	 a	failure	to	acknowledge	an	important	component	of	well-being.			
3.	In	Defence	of	Athletic	Freedom		Why	 is	 it	 so	 important	 that	 the	 government	 ensures	 we	 have	 control	 over	 our	environment,	rather	than	simply	promoting	our	well-being,	even	if	our	own	role	in	its	achievement	is	a	passive	one?	To	answer,	I	will	focus	on	the	passively-achieved	benefits	that	most	 concern	 Cohen:	 ‘freedoms-from’	 environmental	 obstacles,	 in	 particular	 the	freedom	 from	 diseases	 such	 as	 malaria.	 Freedom	 from	 malaria	 seems	 like	 a	 prime	example	of	something	the	government	ought	 to	promote	regardless	of	our	choices	or	preferences,	 and	 even	 if	we	 do	 not	 play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 achieving	 this	 benefit.	 Yet,	Cohen	 objects,	 capability	 theorists	 cannot	 acknowledge	 the	 value	 of	 such	 passively-achieved	 benefits.	Moreover,	 the	 ‘freedom-from’	 such	 a	 harm	 or	 burden	 removes	 an	available	 option	 or	 limits	 our	 capabilities	 (to	 be	 subject	 to	 that	 harm),	 which	 may	appear	contrary	to	the	aims	of	the	capability	approach.			I	will	argue	that	valuing	the	freedom-from	some	environmental	obstacles	is	compatible	with	 the	 capability	 approach,	 but	 that	 they	 should	 not	 be	 unilaterally	 promoted	 by	governments	(§3.1).	Instead,	in	cases	where	a	group	is	necessarily	affected	by	a	policy,	the	group	should	decide	whether	the	policy	–	such	as	the	eradication	of	malaria	–	will																																																									16	As	discussed	(§2.2),	Sen	(2001:	54-56)	rejects	the	suggestion	that	possessing	capabilities	requires	that	our	ability	to	function	is	independent	of	the	permission	or	goodwill	of	a	third-party.	However,	I	contend	that	as	a	guide	to	policy	permit-independent	capabilities	should	be	our	goal.		17	For	those	committed	to	a	preference-independent	account	of	well-being	–	such	as	Arneson	in	recent	work	(e.g.	2010)	–	 the	 idea	 that	we	should	give	 individuals	control,	even	when	 they	will	 ‘misuse’	 it	by	giving	up	valuable	options,	will	never	be	plausible.	My	goal	is	not	to	convince	them	otherwise.		
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be	pursued	(§3.2).	In	such	collective	action	cases,	individuals	simply	cannot	have	direct	control,	since	this	would	undermine	others’	freedom.	Thus,	having	freedom	as	control	may	merely	require	participation	in	a	democratic	system:	the	possession	of	‘collective	capabilities’.	 These	 collective	 capabilities	 ensure	 that	 individual	 agency	 is	 respected,	and	paternalism	is	avoided,	 in	cases	where	individual	capabilities	cannot	be	provided	(§3.3).	 I	 will,	 therefore,	 demonstrate	 that	 Cohen	 is	 wrong	 to	 suggest	 that	 capability	theorists	 must	 choose	 between	 a	 plausible	 reading	 of	 freedom	 (as	 control),	 and	properly	conceptualising	well-being.			
3.1	Freedoms-from	and	Capabilities			To	undermine	the	plausibility	of	capability	theorists’	concentration	on	freedom,	Cohen	considers	 cases	 where	 benefits	 are	 achieved	 passively.	 In	 particular,	 when	 we	 are	benefitted	by	being	made	free	from	a	risk	or	obstacle	“that	impede[s	our]…achievement	of	valuable	functionings	in	choice-insensitive	ways”	(Olsaretti	2005:	94).	For	example:		a	malaria-ridden	environment…render[s]	 the	 functioning	of	being…disease-free	 highly	 difficult	 or	 impossible,	 and…[does]	 so,	 typically,	 in	 choice-insensitive	ways,	in	the	sense	that	someone	exposed	to	these	factors	is	likely	to	come	to	lack	the	relevant	functioning	through	no	choice	of	her	own	(ibid.).		Cohen	insists	that	since	capability	theorists	aim	to	provide	individuals	with	freedom	as	
control	 they	cannot	promote	such	 freedoms-from	obstacles	 (since	 this	would	provide	functionings	 rather	 than	 the	 capability	 to	 function).	 Whilst	 they	 may	 enhance	 our	freedom,	 they	 are	 not	 freedoms	 in	 themselves,	 and	 so	 not	 the	 direct	 concern	 of	 the	capability	approach.	As	Olsaretti	(2005:	93)	presents	Cohen’s	view:		‘Freedom	 from	malaria’	only	 counts	as	a	 capability	on	an	unduly	expansive	sense	 of	 freedom,	 one	 on	 which	 someone’s	 freedom	 is	 enhanced	 when	something	 happens	 to	 her	 or	 her	 environment,	 even	 though	 she	 has	 not	chosen	that	thing	and	has	no	control	over	whether	that	thing	will	be	chosen.		Whilst	 Olsaretti’s	 (2005:	 95-96)	 (and	 Sen’s	 (1993;	 2001))	 response	 is	 to	 defend	 this	‘expansive’	 and	 unathletic	 view	 of	 freedom,	 I	 follow	 Cohen	 in	 agreeing	 that	 freedom	
does	 require	control,	and	that	 ‘freedom	from	malaria’	cannot	plausibly	be	understood	as	 a	 capability.18	 Nonetheless,	 the	 response	 capability	 theorists	 can	 make	 initially																																																									18	 It	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 ‘freedom	 from	malaria’,	 understood	 as	 living	 in	 a	malaria-free	 environment,	does	not	necessarily	remove	all	individual	choice.	If	our	environment	is	just	our	particular	locality,	then	someone	could	retain	the	opportunity	to	contract	malaria	if	they	had	the	resources	to	travel	somewhere	that	is	not	malaria-free.	Moreover,	being	in	a	‘malaria-ridden	environment’	only	makes	the	functioning	of	being	disease-free	 ‘highly	difficult	or	 impossible’	 if	we	 lack	access	 to	anti-malarial	drugs	and	mosquito	nets.	It	is	possible,	then,	to	have	capabilities	–	control	over	our	functioning	–	in	either	environment,	and	Cohen	 and	 Olsaretti	 oversimplify	 matters	 by	 assuming	 that	 our	 environment	 will	 straightforwardly	
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seems	 remarkably	 straightforward:	 they	 need	 not	 consider	 freedoms-from	 to	 be	capabilities	in	order	to	promote	them.			The	 capability	 approach	 aims	 to	 provide	 freedom	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 substantive	
opportunities,	 which	 include	 the	 physical	 and	 psychological	 conditions	 of	 making	 a	choice.	This	seems	likely	to	include	the	removal	of	obstacles	that	prevent	people	from	making	choices:	we	cannot	have	a	secure	capability	 for	good	health	whilst	 living	 in	a	malarial	environment,	 for	example.	As	well	as	securing	new	opportunities,	 freedoms-from	may	also	 improve	our	ability	 to	choose	between	available	options.	For	example,	being	 free	 from	 starvation	 may	 allow	 us	 to	 choose	 to	 leave	 a	 job	 we	 hate,	 if	 the	consequences	 of	 doing	 so	 are	no	 longer	 so	dire	 (starvation).	 Further,	 the	decision	 to	
exercise	some	functionings,	once	free	from	the	obstacles	to	performing	them,	may	also	increase	 our	 ability	 to	 choose.	 For	 example,	 being	nourished	may	 improve	 our	 brain	functioning,	as	well	as	removing	the	distraction	of	perpetual	hunger,	and	so	give	us	a	greater	capacity	for	reasoning	and	decision-making	than	if	we	were	malnourished.19		Thus,	capability	theorists	have	many	reasons	to	value	and,	indeed,	promote	freedoms-from	as	a	means	to	promoting	capabilities,	without	having	to	concede	that	 freedoms-from	 are,	 themselves,	 capabilities.	 Given	 that	 many	 policies	 that	 enhance	 some	capabilities	also	restrict	others,	an	instrumental	argument	of	this	sort	might	require	us	to	make	trade-offs	between	different	capabilities.	In	some	cases,	this	will	only	mean	the	loss	of	opportunities	widely	considered	disvaluable	(for	example,	contracting	malaria)	for	the	sake	of	valuable,	or	central,	capabilities	(the	opportunity	for	good	health).	For	most	 capability	 theorists	 (who	 rely	 on	 a	 list	 of	 specified	 valuable	 functionings)	 this	would	 barely	 be	 considered	 a	 trade-off	 at	 all,	 since	 nothing	 they	 value	 is	 lost.	 Even	where	 the	 lost	 capability	 is	 one	 they	 consider	 valuable,	 giving	 it	 up	may	 be	 justified	where	 another	 valuable	 capability	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 doing	 so.	 This	 is	 a	 familiar	enough	 phenomenon:	 people	 choose	 to	 get	 sterilised	 (to	 be	 ‘free-from	 fertility’),	 and	thus	lose	the	opportunity	to	control	whether	they	have	children,	in	order	to	have	other	options.	The	control	over	our	lives	that	a	capability	gives	us	does	not	require	that	this	control	be	always	maintained.																																																																																																																																																																													determine	our	functioning	achievement.	Nonetheless,	 I	will	also	assume	here	that	these	environmental	changes	 do	 affect	 individual	 functionings	 in	 the	 choice-insensitive	 way	 Cohen	 and	 Olsaretti	 describe:	individuals	 will	 lack	 the	 capability	 to	 be	 disease-free	 in	 a	 malaria-ridden	 environment,	 and	 lack	 the	capability	to	contract	malaria	in	a	malaria-free	one.	This	is	what	this	example	is	intended	to	show,	and	in	actually	 existing	 situations	of	 scarcity,	 this	will	 be	 the	 case.	 Further,	 even	 if	we	grant	Cohen	 that	 such	environmental	changes	are	not	capabilities,	his	critique	still	lacks	bite,	as	I	will	show.	Thanks	to	Fabienne	Peter	for	pressing	me	on	this	point.		19	Olsaretti	(2005:	95-96)	presents	a	similar	argument.		
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The	capability	approach,	then,	does	not	proscribe	decisions	that	limit	our	future	option	sets,	 or	 future	 opportunities	 to	 control	 our	 lives.	 It	 does,	 however,	 proscribe	 such	limitation	of	options	without	the	consultation	of	the	affected	individual.	Sterilisation	is	acceptable	if	chosen	by	the	person	to	be	sterilised,	but	unacceptable	if	it	were	the	result	of	a	government	policy	concerning	population	control.	Responding	to	Cohen’s	cases	is	complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 tend	 to	 concern	 public,	 non-excludable	 goods,	wherein	making	us	free	from	an	obstacle	will	limit	the	future	options	of	many	people.	I	will	 suggest	 (in	 §3.2)	 that	 individuals	 should	 have	 control	 over	 their	 shared	environment,	 as	 well	 as	 control	 over	 the	 more	 specific	 functionings	 they	 perform.	Further,	that	when	a	group	is	affected	by	these	environmental	changes,	it	is	the	affected	
group	who	should	exercise	control	(since	individual	control	is	impossible).			Before	 analysing	 freedom	 as	 control	 in	 collective	 cases,	 however,	 it	 is	 worth	considering	 how	 capability	 theorists	 not	 committed	 to	 providing	 capabilities	 for	specific	 valuable	 functionings	 should	 respond	 to	 Cohen’s	 critique.	 On	 such	 a	 view,	though	 we	 identify	 specific	 valuable	 capabilities	 (for	 example,	 for	 health),	 these	 are	interpreted	 as	 domains	 of	 control,	 rather	 than	 the	 ability	 to	 perform	 a	 specific	functioning	 (being	 healthy).	 Thus,	 this	 view	 would	 not	 distinguish	 ‘valuable’	functionings	–	such	as	controlling	our	reproduction	–	from	‘disvaluable’	functionings	–	such	as	contracting	malaria.	We	should	have	control	over	all	aspects	of	our	health.	 It	would,	therefore,	be	problematic	if	individuals	were	forcibly	denied	the	opportunity	to	contract	malaria,	 just	 as	 it	would	 be	 if	 they	were	 forcibly	 denied	 the	 opportunity	 to	have	children.	In	both	cases,	we	should	be	able	to	control	both	whether	we	have	these	opportunities,	and	the	use	we	make	of	them.			I	believe	this	approach	captures	the	capability	approach’s	underlying	liberal	goals:	that	individuals	be	enabled	to	autonomously	form	and	pursue	their	own	conception	of	the	good,	and	that	respect	for	human	dignity	requires	that	we	allow	individuals	to	exercise	their	 agency.	 It	 also	 better	 encapsulates	 Pettit’s	 suggestion	 that	 freedom	be	 content-	independent,	and	provides	a	response	 to	Carter’s	claim	that	an	 identifiable	capability	approach	 cannot	 provide	 content-independent	 freedom,	 and	 so	 avoid	 paternalism.20	However,	whether	or	not	this	approach	seems	plausible,21	it	is	worth	considering	since																																																									20	This	does	not,	 as	Carter	 (2014:	94-97)	 suggests,	 amount	 to	a	 concern	 for	 ‘capability	as	 such’,	which	may	 collapse	 into	welfarism	 (giving	people	what	 they	most	want),	 or	 resourcism	 (giving	 individuals	 a	bundle	 of	 resources	 to	 use	 them	 as	 they	wish).	 I	 agree	with	 Carter	 that	 anti-paternalism	 requires	 the	promotion	of	non-specific	freedom,	but	this	does	not	mean	that	we	are	equally	entitled	to	all	freedoms.	We	should	not	tell	individuals	what	use	to	make	of	their	capability	to	control	their	health,	but	we	should	provide	 them	with	 this	 capability,	 rather	 than	 the	 capability	 to	 go	 to	 the	 Fun	House	 (Anderson	 1999:	332)	or	to	buy	a	Stradivarius	(Dworkin	2000:	61).		21	I	provide	a	more	complete	defence	of	this	view	elsewhere	(Begon	unpublished).		
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it	is	especially	vulnerable	to	Cohen’s	criticisms,	given	that	it	requires	that	individuals	be	in	 control	 in	 a	 greater	 range	 of	 cases	 (even	 when	 all	 that	 is	 lost	 is	 an	 apparently	disvaluable	 opportunity).	 To	 defend	 even	 this	 ‘excessive’	 athleticism	 seems	 the	 best	way	to	show	that	Cohen’s	concerns	about	athleticism	are	misplaced.		
3.2	Collective	Capabilities	and	Democracy		I	have	suggested	that	the	capability	approach	should	provide	individuals	with	freedom,	in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 ability	 to	 exercise	 control	 over	 central	 domains	 of	 their	 life,	 not	simply	to	ensure	that	we	get	what	we	want	in	these	domains	(or	what	some	capability	theorists	 consider	 good	 for	 people),	 but	 to	 ensure	we	 are	 treated	 in	 an	 appropriate	(non-paternalistic)	way:	our	agency	is	respected.	Not	getting	what	we	most	want	may	be	detrimental	to	our	well-being,	but	it	need	not	be	paternalist.	Enforced	sterilisation,	then,	 is	 not	 just	 problematic	 because	 some	 individuals	 lose	 a	 valued	 opportunity	 (to	have	 children),	 which	 may	 decrease	 their	 well-being.	 More	 importantly,	 overriding	individuals’	preferences	insults	their	agency	in	a	characteristically	paternalist	way,	by	distrusting	their	ability	to	make	decisions	in	their	own	best	interests.	To	reiterate,	then,	a	 capability	 approach	 to	distributive	 justice	 is	not	 designed	 to	 ensure	 that	 individual	well-being	 is	maximised,	but	 to	allow	 them	 freedom	as	control	over	 their	 lives.	 I	will	now	consider	what	it	means	to	have	such	freedom	in	collective	cases.			My	proposal	is	that	just	as	an	individual	should	not	be	denied	an	opportunity	without	consultation,	neither	should	a	group.	As	discussed,	capability	theorists	do	not	prohibit	individuals	 from	 sacrificing	 opportunities,	 but	 they	 must	 autonomously	 choose	 this	sacrifice.22	Hence,	 just	as	sterilisation	should	not	be	forced	on	an	individual,	so	public	health	policies	should	not	be	unilaterally	imposed	on	a	group:	an	individual	should	not	be	 forcibly	made	 ‘free-from	 fertility’,	 and	a	group	should	not	have	 their	 environment	forcibly	 made	 ‘free-from	 malaria’.	 If	 a	 concern	 for	 losing	 disvaluable	 options	 seems	implausible,	we	can	consider	cases	in	which	valuable	opportunities	are	sacrificed.	For	example,	 the	 industrialisation	of	a	 landscape	 that	provides	much-needed	 jobs	only	at	the	expense	of	preventing	individuals	from	“being	able	to	live	with	concern	for	and	in	relation	 to	 animals,	 plants,	 and	 the	 world	 of	 nature”23.	 Here,	 the	 alteration	 of	 the	
																																																								22	 Some	 capability	 theorists	 occasionally	 seem	 willing	 to	 prevent	 individuals	 giving	 up	 what	 they	consider	 valuable	 opportunities.	 For	 example,	 Nussbaum’s	 (1999:	 118-129)	 insistence	 that	 women	should	not	be	 allowed	 to	 sacrifice	 their	 capability	 for	 sexual	 satisfaction	by	undergoing	 female	 genital	cutting.	This	is	inconsistent	with	the	anti-paternalist	and	political	liberal	commitments	that	motivate	her	approach,	however,	(for	further	discussion,	see	Chambers	2008:	159-202).		23	This	is	Nussbaum’s	(2000:	80)	eighth	central	capability.		
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environment,	creating	the	background	conditions	for	some	members	of	a	group	to	have	central	capabilities,	will	also	lead	to	(at	least	some)	others	losing	a	central	capability.			This	 loss	 of	 capability	 is	 legitimate	 only	 if	 the	 group	 controls	 whether	 the	 policy	 is	implemented,	 where	 ‘control’	 will	 mean	 all	 individuals’	 preferences	 are	 counted	equally	 in	 the	 democratic	 process.	 (Though	 protection	 of	 individual	 capabilities	 will	mean	such	democratic	control	 is	not	appropriate	in	every	case	(as	§3.3	will	discuss).)	Indeed,	I	would	suggest	that	groups	should	have	control	even	when	the	capability	lost	is	disvaluable:	 there	should	be	democratic	control	over	 the	 introduction	of	both	anti-malarial,	and	urban	planning,	programmes.	This	is	because,	for	capability	theorists,	the	relevant	problem	with	the	undemocratic	introduction	of	such	policies	is	not	that	some	people	 lose	 a	 desired	 (or	 ‘valuable’)	 opportunity,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 not	 respected	 as	agents	capable	of	choice.			To	 elucidate	 this	 idea	of	 collective	 control,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 further	 consider	 the	 role	 of	permit-independence.	 I	 have	 argued	 (contrary	 to	 Sen)	 that,	when	 used	 as	 a	 guide	 to	policy,	 the	 capability	 approach	 should	 incorporate	 a	 concern	 for	 permit-independent	freedom,	as	Pettit	suggests.	However,	I	suggest	that	it	is	not	enough	to	focus,	as	Pettit	does,	only	on	 first-order,	 and	not	 second-order,	 freedom	as	 control.	To	 illustrate	 this	point,	imagine	two	benevolent	potentates.	The	first	sets	up	a	social	infrastructure,	such	as	 a	 system	of	healthcare	and	education,	but	once	 set	 in	motion,	he	no	 longer	 exerts	control	over	its	running,	and	so	access	to	it	is	not	dependent	on	his	whims.	Imagine,	for	example,	 that	 he	 formally	 relinquishes	 control	 over	 its	 operation	 to	 an	 independent	body	over	which	he	has	no	influence.	The	second	is	as	Pettit	describes:	he	continues	to	control	who	has	access	to	health	and	education	(even	if	this	power	is	never	exercised).			On	Pettit’s	 view	we	are	 free	when	we	are	not	being	dominated,	 and	are	not	 liable	 to	domination,	so	Pettit	would	consider	the	individuals	in	the	first	society	free,	since	the	potentate	 lacks	 the	 power	 to	 dominate	 them.	 Their	 capabilities	 for	 health	 and	education	are	permit-independent:	not	reliant	on	the	favour	of	a	third-party.	Yet,	whilst	they	do	have	the	individual	capabilities	for	health	and	education,	they	lack	control	over	the	establishment	of	these	conditions,	and	so	lack	freedom	in	an	important	sense.	Just	as	 it	would	not	be	unsatisfactory	 for	a	disabled	person’s	capability	 for	mobility	 to	be	dependent	on	 the	goodwill	of	others,	 so	would	 it	be	unsatisfactory	 for	a	population’s	access	to	a	health	service	to	depend	on	the	benevolence	of	their	dictatorial	government.	Hence	my	 suggestion	 that	when	 a	 group	 is	 affected	 by	 a	 policy,	 it	 is	 the	 group	who	should	control	whether	this	policy	is	implemented.			
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Whilst	citizens	of	a	dictatorship	lack	such	control,	as	citizens	of	a	democratic	state	our	preferences	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 decisive.	 As	 Pettit	 (2007:	 18)	 notes,	 “[a]	democratic	 government	 is	 passively	 forced	 to	 respect	 what	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 my	preferences	or	the	preferences	that	we	in	a	certain	group	–	perhaps	the	citizenry	as	a	whole	 –	 share”.	 	 Thus,	 even	 if	 citizens	 do	 not	 have	 direct	 control	 over	 policy,	 their	preferences	as	a	group	determine	the	shape	policy	takes	(or	should	do).24	Freedom	as	control	 therefore	 requires	 that	 when	 only	 an	 individual	 is	 affected,	 their	 preference	alone	should	control	the	outcome;	and	when	a	group	is	affected,	the	group	should	have	control.	This	 is	 largely	for	the	simple	reason	that	 it	would	be	 impossible	to	allow	any	other	sort	of	control	in	group	cases:	to	allow	one	individual’s	choices	or	preferences	to	be	decisive	would	remove	control	entirely	from	other	individuals.	The	ability	of	groups	to	exert	control	over	policy	implementation	will	be	called	collective	capabilities.25			A	natural	worry	is	that	such	collective	freedom	to	control	government	policy	gives	each	individual	 very	 little	 ‘real’	 control	 over	 determining	 what	 the	 outcome	 will	 be.	However,	as	discussed,	the	value	of	control	 is	not	to	ensure	we	get	the	outcome	most	conducive	to	our	well-being	(or	 the	outcome	we	would,	 individually,	prefer),	but	 that	we	are	 treated	 appropriately	 (respected).	Remember	 that	 an	 act	 is	 paternalist	 if	 it	 is	
motivated	by	a	distrust	of	individuals’	choices,	and	disrespect	of	their	agency.	To	be	in	the	minority	in	a	democratic	vote	is	not	to	be	subject	to	a	paternalistic	insult	when	the	government	 acts	 on	 the	majority	decision.	 In	 contrast,	when	 the	 government	 acts	 on	what	 it	 considers	 the	 good	 of	 the	 majority,	 without	 taking	 account	 of	 anyone’s	decisions,	all	citizens	are	insulted,	even	those	who	would	have	supported	the	policy	if	they	 were	 given	 the	 chance.26	 Avoiding	 paternalism,	 and	 ensuring	 individuals	 have	freedom	as	control,	does	not	require	that	no	individuals’	desires	are	ever	frustrated,	but	
																																																								24	 This	 is	 similar	 to	 Crocker	 and	Robeyn’s	 (2010:	 78)	 ‘indirect	 agency’,	where	 an	 individual	 exercises	agency	even	if	they	only	play	“a	minor	role	in	the	causal	chain”,	which	may	include	“communicating	with	appropriate	 officials”	 if	 this	 is	 efficacious.	 This	 approach	 need	 not	 imply	 that	 direct	 democracy	 is	appropriate	for	every	government	decision.	There	are	many	areas	–	the	minutiae	of	healthcare	policies,	for	 example	–	 that	we	 lack	 the	 time	and	expertise	 to	 engage	with	 effectively.	Yet	 even	 if	 governments	make	 some	unilateral	decisions	 regarding	 specific	policies,	 citizens	 should	 still	 be	 consulted	 regarding	general	policy	direction.		25	 The	 idea	 of	 collective	 capabilities	 used	 here	 should	 be	 distinguished	 from	 another	 conception	 of	collective	 capabilities,	 sometimes	 called	 ‘group	 capabilities’	 (e.g.	 Ibrahim	 2011:	 Alkire	 2008;	 Stewart	2006).	This	term	is	used	to	capture	the	importance	of	groups	in	enabling	individuals	to	achieve	valuable	capabilities:	“the	newly	generated	functioning	bundles	a	person	obtains	by	virtue	of	his/her	engagement	in	a	collectivity	that	help	her/him	achieve	the	life	he/she	has	reason	to	value”	(Ibrahim	2011:	398).	I	do	not	 doubt	 the	 importance	 of	 collective	 capabilities	 in	 this	 sense,	 but	 my	 focus	 here	 is	 on	 the	 role	 of	groups	 in	 making	 decisions	 which	 determine	 the	 capabilities	 available	 to	 individuals,	 and	 not	 on	capabilities	that	are	only	available	in	particular	social	contexts.		26	It	is	generally	considered	paternalistic	both	to	act	on	someone’s	behalf,	without	allowing	them	to	make	a	choice,	and	to	override	a	choice	they	have	made	(e.g.	Shiffrin	2000:	214;	Groll	2012:	697-698).		
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that	 their	 preferences	 are	 respected.	 I	 contend	 that	 individuals’	 preferences	 are	respected	when	they	are	all	given	equal	weight	and	value.27			
3.3	The	Limits	of	Collective	Decision-Making		However,	such	collective	decision-making	is	clearly	not	appropriate	(or	appropriately	respectful)	in	every	case.	I	will,	therefore,	provide	a	sketch	of	the	kinds	of	decisions	that	should	be	made	collectively.	Collective	decisions	establish	background	environmental	conditions,	 which	 determine	 individuals’	 option	 sets	 –	 whether	 a	 health	 service,	 a	disease,	 or	 a	 job	 is	 available	 –	 and	 individuals	 retain	 the	 individual	 capability	 to	determine	which	of	 the	available	options	 they	utilise.	There	will	always	be	a	 tension,	then,	between	 individual	and	collective	capabilities,	so	 it	 is	 important	 to	consider	 the	extent	of	the	restrictions	a	group	can	impose	on	its	members.		It	 may	 be	 helpful	 to	 begin	 with	 an	 example	 of	 a	 capability	 with	 both	 collective	 and	individual	elements,	such	as	health.	There	are	numerous	health	policies	that	affect	all	individuals,	 such	 as	 the	 availability	 of	 certain	 drugs	 or	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 public	health	service.	In	many	such	cases,	collective	capabilities	are	appropriate,	and	decisions	should	be	made	by	all	individuals,	counted	as	equals.	Consequently,	not	all	individuals	will	get	their	ideal	option	set:	for	example,	libertarians	may	be	compelled	to	contribute	to	 a	 public	 health	 service.	 However,	 though	 individuals	 are	 not	 guaranteed	 their	preferred	option,	 freedom	as	 control	 requires	 that	 individuals	 are,	 as	 far	 as	possible,	provided	with	a	range	of	options.28				For	 example,	 compare	 two	 vaccinations	 against	 serious,	 but	 rarely	 life-threating,	diseases;	both	of	which	require	a	high	proportion	of	the	population	to	be	immunised	to	be	effective.	In	the	first	case,	the	vaccine	has	no	side-effects,	whilst	in	the	second	it	will	cause	infertility	in	a	reasonably	large	number	of	cases	(say,	half).	A	collective	decision	to	adopt	a	compulsory	programme	of	vaccinations	in	the	first	case	seems	permissible.	Although	it	will	deprive	individuals	of	the	capability	to	contract	the	particular	disease,	and	slightly	lessens	their	control	over	their	healthcare,	they	still	retain	general	control																																																									27	 It	may	be	objected	that	some	preferences	do	have	more	value	than	others,	so	should	not	be	counted	equally:	for	example,	my	choice	to	be	healthy	over	your	choice	to	smoke	in	public.	However,	this	can	be	conceded	without	paternalism:	we	can	take	the	choice	of	anyone	regarding	their	health	to	have	special	value,	without	suggesting	anyone’s	choices	are	worth	less.	This	is	accommodated	by	understanding	the	capability	approach	as	an	account	of	distributive	justice,	in	which	some	domains	of	control	(like	health)	are	the	concern	of	justice,	whilst	others	(like	choosing	where	to	smoke)	are	not.	(See	fn.20.)	28	What	 constitutes	 an	 appropriate	 range	 is	 a	 complex	 question,	 and	 I	 will	 not	 attempt	 to	 specify	 an	answer.	However,	 I	broadly	accept	Olsaretti’s	 (2004:	119-21)	contention	 that	voluntary	choice	usually	requires	 that	 we	 have	 acceptable	 alternatives.	 I	 would,	 however,	 dispute	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	standard	of	acceptability	should	be	objective,	especially	when	making	decisions	regarding	public	policy.			
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over	their	health.	Compulsory	immunisation	is	unlikely	to	be	permissible	in	the	second	case,	however,	since	this	completely	removes	some	individuals’	control	over	a	central	domain	(their	“choice	in	matters	of	reproduction”	(Nussbaum	2000:	78)).			There	will,	of	course,	be	many	difficult	cases:	if	the	disease	was	life-threatening,	could	we	 compel	 individuals	 to	 have	 the	 second	 vaccine?29	 How	 high	 would	 the	 risk	 of	becoming	 infertile	have	 to	be	before	 forcing	us	 to	have	 the	vaccine	 is	 impermissible?	Could	 we	 expect	 those	 with	 certain	 religious	 views,	 such	 as	 Jehovah’s	Witnesses,	 to	receive	 even	 the	 first	 vaccine?	 More	 generally,	 then,	 who	 constitutes	 the	 relevant	collective	 for	 a	 collective	 capability,	 and	 what	 decisions	 can	 they	 make	 for	 other	members	of	that	collective?			Drawing	strict	 lines	here	will	be	difficult,	but	 the	 intention	 is	 that:	 (a)	 those	who	are	affected	 should	 constitute	 the	 relevant	 group;	 (b)	 decisions	 should	 be	 made	 by	 a	collective	only	in	cases	when	a	group	is	necessarily	affected;	and	(c)	an	effort	should	be	made	for	individuals	to	retain	a	space	to	exercise	control	over	central	domains	of	their	lives.	 These	 criteria	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 collective	 capabilities,	 and	 prevent	 a	majority	decision	from	unacceptably	limiting	the	freedom	of	the	minority.	For	example,	a	policy	of	 forced	 sterilisation	would	 be	 illegitimate	 because:	 individuals	 outside	 the	 affected	group	would	exert	control	over	those	within	it	(violating	(a));	it	is	unlikely	that	this	is	a	decision	that	must	be	placed	in	the	hands	of	a	group	(violating	(b));	and	it	clearly	and	severely	limits	the	capacity	to	choose	of	the	individuals	affected	(violating	(c)).			Defending	 the	 capability	 approach	 does	 not	 require	 that	 all	 these	 complex	 issues	 be	resolved.	It	is	enough	to	outline	how	the	protection	and	promotion	of	‘athletic’	freedom	in	 public	 policy	 may	 be	 plausible,	 and	 show	 that	 this	 does	 not	 commit	 capability	theorists	 to	 a	 similarly	 ‘athletic’	 reading	of	well-being.	 I	 suggest,	 then,	 that	 capability	theorists	 should	 provide	 individuals	 with	 collective	 control	 over	 the	 external	conditions	that	affect	groups	of	which	they	are	a	member,	and	individual	control	over	which	specific	functionings	they	perform,	given	these	external	conditions.	For	example,	a	group	may	decide	that	a	drug	is	made	available,	but	individuals	decide	whether	they	want	 to	 take	 it;	 a	group	decides	whether	a	public	health	 service	 should	exist,	 and	an	individual	 decides	 whether	 they	 use	 it.30	 This	 may	 not	 always	 maximise	 individual	well-being,	but	for	capability	theorists	this	is	not	the	goal	of	distributive	policy.	It	does																																																									29	Of	course,	if	the	disease	is	not	contagious	individuals	should	never	be	compelled	to	have	the	vaccine,	however	life-threatening	the	disease.		30	Arguably,	it	would	not	be	a	legitimate	exercise	of	collective	capabilities	to	have	no	public	health	service	since	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 violate	 (at	 least)	 condition	 (c):	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 healthcare	 will	 severely	 limit	individuals’	ability	to	exercise	control	over	many	important	domains	of	their	life.		
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respect	individual	agency	and	autonomy,	and	allow	individuals	the	athletic	freedom	to	control	 the	 environment	 in	 which	 they	 live,	 the	 options	 they	 face,	 and	 the	 use	 they	make	of	them.	Such	‘athletic	policies’	should	not	be	avoided.31			
4.	Conclusion			Cohen	insists	that	the	capability	approach	must	choose	between	an	implausibly	weak	definition	of	freedom	(according	to	which	we	are	‘free’	even	when	we	have	no	capacity	for	 control),	 or	 an	 implausibly	 athletic	 account	 of	 well-being	 (wherein	 something	 is	only	 good	 for	 us	 if	we	 achieve	 it	 for	 ourselves).	 This	 is	 a	 false	 dichotomy.	When	 the	capability	approach	is	understood	as	a	guide	to	 just	distributive	policy,	 it	can	adopt	a	plausible	understanding	of	freedom	(as	control)	without	denying	that	when	the	world	coincidentally	 conforms	 to	 our	 will	 this	 may	 improve	 our	 well-being.	 Public	 policy	should	not	aim	simply	to	maximise	 individual	well-being,	however,	but	should	aim	to	protect	and	promote	 individual	autonomy,	treat	 individuals	with	appropriate	respect,	and	avoid	paternalism.	This,	 anyway,	 is	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 capability	 approach,	 and	why	many	find	it	a	convincing	answer	to	the	‘equality	of	what?’	question.	Cohen	may	object	that	our	answer	to	this	question	should	give	greater	prominence	to	well-being,	but	he	has	 not	 shown	 that	 the	 capability	 approach	 is	 internally	 incoherent.	 For	 those	 who	consider	 the	 promotion	 of	 autonomy	 a	 more	 central	 concern	 of	 justice	 than	 always	protecting	well-being,	then,	the	approach	will	remain	appealing.	Thus,	to	the	suggestion	that	their	understanding	of	freedom	is	excessively	athletic,	capability	theorists	should	respond	 that	 it	 is	 proudly	 so:	 government	 policy	 should	 aim	 to	 provide	 people	 with	athletic	freedom	as	control	over	decisions	in	central	parts	of	their	lives.			
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